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Abstract 
The concerted responses of eusocial insects to environmental stimuli are often referred to as 
collective cognition on the level of the colony.To achieve collective cognitiona group can 
draw on two different sources: individual cognitionand the connectivity between 
individuals.Computation in neural-networks, for example,is attributedmore tosophisticated 
communication schemes than to the complexity of individual neurons. The case of social 
insects, however, can be expected to differ. This is since individual insects are cognitively 
capable units that are often able to process information that is directly relevant at the level 
of the colony.Furthermore, involved communication patterns seem difficult to implement in a 
group of insects since these lack clear network structure.This review discusses links between 
the cognition of an individual insect and that of the colony. We provide examples for 
collective cognition whose sources span the full spectrum between amplification of individual 
insect cognition and emergent group-level processes. 
Introduction 
The individuals that make up a social insect colony are so tightly knit that they are often 
regarded as a single super-organism(Wilson and Hölldobler, 2009). This point of view seems 
to go far beyond a simple metaphor(Gillooly et al., 2010)and encompasses aspects of the 
colony that are analogous to cell differentiation(Emerson, 1939), metabolic rates(Hou et al., 
2010; Waters et al., 2010), nutrient regulation(Behmer, 2009),thermoregulation(Jones, 
2004; Starks et al., 2000), gas exchange(King et al., 2015), and more.  
It is tempting to push this analogy, one step further and attribute the superorganism with 
collective cognition(Couzin, 2009; Franks, 1989; Seeley, 1996). In this respect, it is possible to 
envision two extreme cases in which groups of insects may have evolved to exhibit cognition 
on the scale of the entire colony. The first is reliance on the cognition of the individuals that 
make up the group. Indeed, the cognitive abilities of a single ant or bee within the large 
colony are far from being simple (Dornhaus and Franks, 2008). The group can benefit from 
these capabilities, for example, by sharing and refining the knowledge of informed 
individuals. The second extreme case is collective cognition derived from the interaction 
between members. Manmade systems teach us that complex computation can be achieved 
by the wiring together of very simple components such as logical gates (Lindgren and 
Nordahl, 1990). Similarly, social insect colonies often display dense interaction networks 
(Wilson and Hölldobler, 1988)and collective behaviors that appear to exceed the capacity of 
the individuals of which they are comprised (Sumpter, 2006). 
2 
 
It is therefore of interest to trace the collective actions of the social insect colony to their 
sources, be they the cognition of individuals or the communication network that connect 
groups of such individuals. Mapping out the relations between these two organizational 
scales is required if one is to understand and quantify collective cognition as well as learn 
about its evolutionary origins.We hypothesize that individual-based collective behaviors will 
be prevalent in cases where abilities, similar to those exhibited by solitary insects, suffice in 
order to sense, grasp, and process knowledge that is relevant on the scale of the colony. 
Deviations from this will tend to lead to group solutions that involve an increased emergent 
component. 
Outline 
The outline of this review is as follows: First, we discuss the cognitive abilities of the 
individuals that make up the social insect colony andsome current knowledge of 
communication networks in social insects. As mentioned above, these two components 
provide the basis on which the colony could build its collective capabilities. Next, we present 
a list of examples of collective cognition. These examples are ordered by the degree to 
which collective behaviors rely on each of the two components, from individual-based to 
connectivity-based. The examples are split into three categories: Individual-based collective 
behaviors, collective behaviors that combine different individual perspectives, and, finally, 
collective behaviors that display higher levels of emergence. Each of these categories is 
divided into subcategories that further refine this division. Taken together, these examples 
span a broad spectrum of relationships between individual and collective cognition. In the 
final section we discuss the possible factors that may determine the degree of emergence in 
a particular collective behavior.  
Individual cognition 
A good starting point for discussing the origins of cognition in social insect colonies is the 
cognitive abilities of solitary insects. Insect brains have evolved hundreds of millions of 
years(Farris and Schulmeister, 2010; Ma et al., 2012)prior to the appearance of 
eusociality(Moreau, 2006).  Despite the fact that their brains are relatively small(Chittka and 
Niven, 2009),solitary insects exhibit high cognitive skills that include large behavioral 
repertoires(Evans, 1966), complex forms of learning(Alloway, 1972; Blackiston et al., 2011), 
and include navigational skills that often exceed those of humans(Brower, 1996). These 
abilities aid the solitary insect, among other things, inforaging (O’Neill, 2001), finding or 
constructing shelters(Raw, 1972), confronting predators(Schmidt, 1990), and identifying 
appropriate mating partners(Dickson, 2008).   
The next step in this discussion is the transitions to eusociality which happened 
between100-150 million years ago(Brady et al., 2006; Engel et al., 2009). Eusociality is 
characterized by reproductive division of labor that drastically lowers the level of conflict 
between group members as they strive towards common goals (Crespi and Yanega, 1995). It 
is first important to state the evident fact that, contrary to cells in a tissue or neurons in the 
brain, insects within the colony superorganism maintain their individuality. They are able of 
autonomous motion and decision making.Further, the brains of individuals within a colony 
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bear high resemblance to those of solitary insects(Strausfeld, 1976). One may therefore ask 
how the cognitive capabilities a social insect compare to those of a solitary insect. To date, it 
is not clear if once grouped into large groups evolution may work to increase or decrease the 
cognitive complexity of individuals. On the one hand, it is known, mainly from vertebrate 
groups that the communication requirements of group living may work to increase brain 
complexity(Shultz and Dunbar, 2010). On the other hand, it has been suggested that, relying 
on collective processes may ease the energetically expensive(Aiello and Wheeler, 1995) 
maintenanceof brain tissue(Anderson and McShea, 2001; Feinerman and Traniello, 2015). 
Whatever the exact comparison between the brains of a social and a solitary insect, it is 
clear that thesocial insect is a cognitively capable individual. Individuals within the colony 
possess the capacity for large behavioral repertoires(Chittka and Niven, 2009), for weighing 
a large number of factors to reach individual decisions(Franks et al., 2003), andfor navigating 
over large distances(Gathmann and Tscharntke, 2002; Wehner, 2003). Importantly, these 
individual capabilities are relevant on the scale of the entire colony. 
One aspectthat clearly differentiates the social insect from its solitary counterpart is the 
capacity for communication. For example, eusocial insects display a huge diversification of 
cuticular pheromones(van Wilgenburg et al., 2011) used to convey multiple signals that are 
unique to colony life(Howard and Blomquist, 2005). Another famous example is the 
honeybee waggle dance(Von Frisc, 1950). While solitary insects may have the motivation to 
conceal a newly found item for personal consumption(Byrne et al., 2003), the bees have 
evolved an elaborate communication scheme which allows them to share this location.These 
and other interaction skills form the foundation of the insect society. In the next section we 
discuss some of the properties of the communication networks via which social insects 
coordinate their activities. 
Interaction Networks 
Group living animals combine personal and social information when deciding upon their next 
action(Rieucau and Giraldeau, 2011). In eusocial insects – the social component of 
information collection is especially important(Wilson and Hölldobler, 1988). 
Correspondingly, the modalities of communication and richness of cues and signals is greatly 
enhanced.  Social insects use a variety of olfactory(Martin and Drijfhout, 2009; Morgan, 
2009), tactile(Razin et al., 2013), visual, and vibrational(Delattre et al., 2015; Roces et al., 
1993)messages as well as multi-model combinations of these (Ramsden et al., 2009) in their 
communication. Broadly speaking, these can be divided into several groups: Some messages 
require direct contact between individuals and can thus be considered as local in both space 
and time. Other signals are local in time but not space and are typically employed as alarm 
signals (e.g. highly volatile pheromones(Blum, 1969)). Yet another group are signals that are 
local in space but not in time. This group includes stigmergic, indirect communication 
between insects in which one individual modifies the environment and a second individual 
arriving at the same location at some later time reacts to its modified 
surroundings(Theraulaz and Bonabeau, 1999). Mass recruitment pheromone trails (Jaffe and 
Howse, 1979)and nest construction without a blueprint (Franks and Deneubourg, 1997)are 
two impressive examples of stigmergy. Note that, for the case of pheromonal 
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communication, the time scales that characterize pheromonal communication are evolvable 
as they depend on chemical evaporation times that,indeed, vary between species and 
tasks(Morgan, 2009; Witte et al., 2007)(Holldobler and Wilson, 1990). 
Quantifying the communication patterns requires descriptive frameworksfor the different 
interaction types as described above. Contact dependent interactions can be described as 
time-ordered (Blonder and Dornhaus, 2011)communication networks(Fewell, 2003; Moreau 
et al., 2011).  It has been shown that, in a laboratory setting, the high mobility of social 
insectsdictates that, after a sufficient time window, interactions occur between practically  
all possible pairs and the network become highly connected (Mersch et al., 2013). Stigmergic 
communication has been described by using the language of statistical mechanics 
(Richardson et al., 2011), or by employing cellular-automata tools typically used to describe 
self-organization processes (Khuong et al., 2016). These interactions are, inherently, one-to-
many signaling and have been shown to extend the connectivity induced by contact 
dependent communication (Richardson and Gorochowski, 2015)..Adding long range 
communication such as that involving alarm pheromones, we obtain a picture of a system in 
which, at least to first order and over long enough time-scales, interactions can be described 
as well mixed. In other words, over time an insect receives signals from any other insect in 
the colony. Not only are interactions mixed they are also, to a large extent anonymous. With 
a few exceptions (Mallon and Franks, 2000; Tibbetts, 2002), it is reasonable to assume that 
individuals do not recognize which of the hundreds to hundreds of thousands of other 
individuals they are currently interacting with. 
While the previous discussion seems to suggest that interactions are completely ergodic, it is 
important to stress that the social insect colony is, by no means, devoid of structure. For 
example, ant nests and bee hives are often concentrically arrangedsuch that young insects 
reside in the deep center while older individuals occupy progressively occupy areas that are 
closer to the boundaries or entrance (Beshers and Fewell, 2001). Even when structure is 
initially lacking, self-organization and amplification of noise can work to create spatio-
temporal patterns over time (Richardson et al., 2011; Theraulaz et al., 2003). Moreover,  ant 
(Tschinkel, 2004) and termite (Noirot and Darlington, 2000) nests exhibit complex structures 
of rooms and corridors and these further reflect on the spatial distribution of individuals 
within the nest. It has been shown that different individuals tend to occupy specific locations 
or chambers within the nest (Jandt and Dornhaus, 2009; Sendova-Franks and Franks, 1995) 
and that this reflects on the probability that they interact with other individuals in other 
parts of the nest (Mersch et al., 2013; Pinter-Wollman et al., 2011). Spatial locations 
therefore inducea network structure that is composed of relatively stable clusters. Hence, in 
a very broad sense, the communication patterns in a social insect colony can be viewed as 
residing between a well-mixed(on the more local scale) and a fixed (on the global, cluster, 
scale) network. 
Collective cognition 
Having described some of the basic “cognitive toolbox” available to the colony, we go on to 
discuss its collective scale behavioral products. In what follows, we presenta non-
comprehensive list of examples for collective behaviors in social insect colonies. 
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Theexamples where chosen while focusing on the different possible gaps between the 
knowledge, actions, and capabilities of individuals and those of the entire group. They are 
ordered by the extent of this gap and divided between individual based collective cognition 
(small gaps) and emergent collective cognition that builds on the interaction between 
insects (large gaps). This division is, by no means, strict. 
Individual based collective cognition 
In a eusocial colony the genetic conflict between individuals in the group is minimal(Queller 
and Strassmann, 1998). This leads to an alignment of interests which implies that it is 
generally advantageous for informed individuals to share their knowledge with other group 
members. Utilizing this information is useful for the group as well. Since the number of 
informed individuals may be small one could expect that their actions be too weak to elicit 
any significanteffect or, alternatively, they be averaged out against opposing actions 
performed by other, less-informed, colony members. Instead of losing this useful 
information, it may be profitable for the group to amplify the actions of these focal 
individuals. Anysuch amplification should be regulated to prevent runaway behavior in case 
of mistakes. Such mistakes could arise from the informed individuals themselves: they may 
hold only partial information or be plain wrong, or from communication: noisy interactions 
may distort the original message.  
Next, we discuss several examples ofamplification circuits that make the products of 
individual cognitionavailable, effective, anduseful at the level of the group. 
Unconditional amplification 
The simplest example is the alarm response. When an individual ant senses danger she not 
only directly reacts to it but further emits a volatile alarm pheromone(Blum, 1969). This 
pheromone spreads around the ant eliciting similar responses from her neighboring nest-
mates. This positive feedback circuit quickly spreads the danger signal to affect a large 
number of individuals(Jeanson and Deneubourg, 2009). This not only increases the group's 
surveillance of its environment (the “many eyes principle”) but also allows it to take 
collective actions towards, for example, protection of the nest. Similar behaviors are 
displayed by termiteswhere chemical communication is accompanied by vibrationalsignaling 
(Delattre et al., 2015). 
These collective positive feedback circuits provide an informed individual that senses danger 
immediate and direct control over the actions of the group. In other words,the gap between 
individual and collective cognition is, practically, nonexistent.The group forsakes regulation 
and out-weights this crucial survival response over the possible price paid by false alarms. 
Conditioned amplification 
The mass recruitment foraging trail occurs as a single first ant locates a food source. This ant 
then uses her navigational skills to return to the nest while laying a pheromone trail that 
recruits others to the food such that foraging commences. While an emergent process may 
work to straighten the trail and make it shorter (see below) the trail still follows the 
qualitative solution as first discovered and then communicated by the initial 




Importantly, in a large number of species, ants strengthen the initial trail only on the way 
back from the target food source and only if they independently found it to be 
profitable(Beckers et al., 1992a; Mailleux et al., 2003; Wilson, 1962). This regulationcan be 
considered as “delayed” since it occurs only after an initial positive response to the initial 
ant. This provides a mechanism by which the group“double-checks”the target 
communicated by the initial ant before continuing to amplify her effect even further. 
Itallows the colony to reduce its response to ants that may have outdated information or 
are, for some reason, confused. Since pheromones are volatile and have a finite lifetime, 
their concentration along the trail depends on the rate at which they are enhanced. A trail 
which is not enhanced will eventually disappear. Thus, delayed regulation further supplies a 
mechanism for calibrating the level of activity on the recruitment trail (Simon and Hefetz, 
1992), discontinuingit once the food source is exhausted(Wilson, 1962). It further allows the 
system to escape local minima by switching to foraging on more profitable food sources 
when such are identified(Beekman and Dussutour, 2007). 
 
Amplification with early regulation 
Desert ants typically forage alone and display only a rudimentary form of recruitment(Amor 
et al., 2010; Razin et al., 2013). The recruitment process occurs as ants that are informed 
about a food source outside the nest attempt to alert their nest-mates using imperfect 
communication. The interactions used are noisy in the sense that a recruitment interaction 
may be ignored or, conversely, a non-recruitment interaction may induce an ant to leave the 
nest. Therefore, amplification of the initial signal must be regulated so that recruitment 
occurs only when a food source is present and runaway behavior that results from mere 
interaction noise is avoided. It was shown that desert ants regulate recruitment early on in 
the process, at the entrance chamber of their nest(Razin et al., 2013). 
 
This regulation is the result of two behavioral components. The firstis the fact that 
individuals "know that they know"(Greenwald et al., 2015). There is a clear difference in the 
way directly and non-directly informed insects react to interactions with others(Razin et al., 
2013; Schultz et al., 2008; Stroeymeyt et al., 2011). For example, ants that have been to the 
food areasimply disregard interactions and maintain high walking speed to increase the 
number and effectiveness of their recruitment interactions(Razin et al., 2013). On the other 
hand, ants with second hand knowledge react to interactions in a more cautious manner. 
These ants can either upregulate or downregulate their propensity to be recruited 
depending on the state of the individual they interact with(Razin et al., 2013). These rules 
allow the ants to regulate collective behavior with minimaldependence on 
theirunreliablecommunication skills. Specifically, thisworks to decrease the chances that the 
actions of non-informed ants have global consequences on the state of the nest and leaves 
the stage, so to say, to the directly informed ants(Razin et al., 2013).  
 
The second regulatory component is an early negative feedback. All else being equal, non-
informed ants tend to lower their propensity to exit with passing time. This leads to a 
collective threshold that dissipates the effects of random or isolated interactions such that 
their effect quickly dies away and this protects the system from noise. A persistent informed 
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ant with first-hand information can generate enough activity such that interaction rates 
increase(Gordon and Mehdiabadi, 1999) and the system moves over this recruitment 
threshold. This early feedback mechanism in which positive feedback occurs only if the 
system passes a set threshold is similar to the generation of spikes in neurons(Razin et al., 
2013). Note that while delayed regulation (as described in the previous subsection) works to 
regulate the amplitude of the collective response and terminate it when the stimulus ends, 
early regulation works to prevent amplification in the first place.  
 
Combining individual perspectives 
Amplifying the optimal option 
The social insect colony may do more than amplifying individual decisions – it can, in fact, 
poll individuals to reach consensus choice regarding the best solution among several 
alternative options. Examples for this come from house-hunting(Visscher, 2007) behaviors in 
ants(Franks et al., 2002) and bees(Seeley et al., 2006). When assessing the quality of a 
potential new nest site scout ants have been shown to incorporate an intricate, individually 
based,evaluation scheme which combines the different attributes of this location (e.g. its 
volume, the size of the door, and the level of light) in a non-trivial way(Franks et al., 
2003).There is evidence that this assessment results in a single grade given by the ant to the 
new location(Robinson et al., 2011; Robinson et al., 2014). The group does not make its own 
assessments of nest quality (a hypothetical example for this could be moving the whole 
colony to occupy the alternative nests one at a time and using the resulting ant density 
(Gordon et al., 1993)to accurately measure the area of each) but, rather, uses a quorum 
sensing as a polling mechanism to compare the assessments of its individual scouts(Franks 
et al., 2002; Seeley et al., 2006). With high probability, this leads to the colony choosing the 
best among the alternatives with the accuracy of the decision growing with the size of the 
group(Sasaki et al., 2013). 
House-hunting provides another fascinating example of how the action of the group may 
work to refine individual decisions: When comparing different nests with specific attributes 
individual ants are prone to violate theregularity principle of rational decision making(Sasaki 
and Pratt, 2011). This principle states that if option A is preferred over option B then this 
should not change upon introducing a third option, C, that is inferior to both. This fallacy is 
not specific to insects but, rather, affects many different animals including humans. 
However, when a whole colony is presented with the choice between these nests it will tend 
to make the rational choice(Edwards and Pratt, 2009; Sasaki and Pratt, 2011). This is because 
the polling often terminates before individual ants have had the chance to fail the regularity 
principle since this requires visiting multiple nests(Robinson et al., 2014). 
We provided several examples (many more exist) of how the actions and decisions of 
capable individuals reflect at the level of the group. The group does not create new solutions 
but ratherworks to amplify, average, poll, and refine the actions of individual members. This 
is done using collective communication circuits that involve positive and negative feedbacks 
and certain non-linearities.  
Amplification in dynamic settings 
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In dynamic, fast-evolving scenarios, Information can quickly become obsolete and the 
individuals that carry useful information (Robson and Traniello, 2002) change over time 
(Gelblum et al., 2015). This entails two inherent problems: First, the relevant individual at a 
specific point in time has to be identified by the group. Second, when an individual that is 
better updated appears the group must revert to following it instead.  
 
This scenario is realized during cooperative transport by longhorn crazy ants (Czaczkes and 
Ratnieks, 2013). When ants cooperatively transport a large food item they can often lose 
orientation and become unknowledgeable regarding the correct way to the nest. To correct 
their path, these ants rely on well-informed individuals that are in the vicinity of the load but 
unattached to it (Gelblum et al., 2015). 
Instead of identifying the ant that currently holds valuable navigational information, here 
again, the group relies on the “know that you know” principle. In other words, an informed 
ant acts in a manner that is different from the other carriers: She attaches to the object and, 
without heeding to others, pulls it in the direction she knows to be correct. At the same time 
the carrying ants "acknowledge that they don't know" and apply a different behavioral rule – 
which is, in a sense, pull in the direction in which the load is currently moving. Together, 
these different rules as applied by informed and non-informed ants allow the group to 
optimally amplify the force of the informed leader (Gelblum et al., 2015). 
Importantly, after a period of about 10 seconds, the newly attached leader loses her 
orientation. This former leader then adapts the behavioral rules of an ordinary carrier and 
may continue in this state for many minutes. The directionality of the carrying group is next 
corrected by the attachment of a new leader ant that happened to be informed at that 
particular time.  The fast switching between leaders can be viewed as a mechanism that 
enables the group to escape being trapped at local minima in which the group displays 
coordinated motion but the direction is wrong. 
Collective bootstrapping of individual solutions 
Another form of colony level solutions that is based on the actions of a large number of 
individuals is trail shortening. Ants are famous for the ability to gradually decrease the 
length of their pheromone trail so that it finally draws a geodesic between the food source 
and the nest (Feynmann, 1985). This process can occur by the accumulated effect of ants 
that leave the trail (Deneubourg et al., 1983) and return to it a short distance away. Useful 
detours, i.e. those that “cut a corner” and slightly decrease the trail’s length, are then 
amplified by the group while non-useful detours are abandoned (Deneubourg et al., 1983; 
Goss et al., 1989; Reid et al., 2011).  
 
Even though trail shortening utilizes segments that were offered by individual ants, it is 
inherently different from the amplification schemes described in the previous section. This 
difference is manifested in the fact that in the previous examples require that the informed 
ant “know that she knows” and assess the quality of the information that she holds. 
Conversely, during trail shortening ants that mark short-cuts are not required to hold any 
knowledge about the quality of their solutions. Rather, it is the group that either amplifies or 
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eventually ignores this alternative trail segments through a pheromone based positive-
feedback mechanism. 
 
Emergent collective cognition  
So far, we focused on group level behaviors that gain their computational power by 
amplifying the actions and decisions of individuals. This differs from the notion of emergent 
cognition wherein collective scale processes allow the group to qualitatively transcend 
individual capabilities. 
An intuitive example for emergence is the different physical phases of matter. Here, minimal 
changes in temperature or the coupling between microscopic particles leads to qualitatively 
different macroscopic phases (e.g. the solid to liquid transition). It is therefore interesting to 
ask whether grouping together, not simple inanimate particles, but rather cognitive 
individuals with a memory and complex behavioral rules can be expected to display different 
and perhaps higher forms of emergence. Specifically, what forms of cognitive emergence 
occur in the case of social insects? In this section, we list several examples for emergent 
collective actions. As before, the examples are loosely ordered according to the increasing 
gaps between the individual and the group.  
Weighted response to multiple stimuli 
Since they are grouped into large ensembles individual insects are, inevitably, much smaller 
than the size of the colony and its territory. As a consequence, individuals cannot have direct 
access to large-scale environmental and internal colony conditions. Despite this, the colony 
as a whole must react to the full set of stimuli and appropriately divide the work 
force(Robinson, 1992).Models(Beshers and Fewell, 2001) suggestthat colony level division of 
labor can result from single insects with different task thresholds(Bonabeau, 1996)that 
resolve work demands which they locally experience(Franks and Tofts, 1994). Similar to the 
house-hunting example described above this colony level phenomenon relies on the 
cognitive assessments of individuals. The difference being that, in this case, the colony does 
not form a consensus around the solution of a single individual but rather divides the work 
force in a weighted manner according to information that is too spread out tobe available to 
any one individual. Division of labor can include more complex mechanisms, such as 
recruitment, that allow ants to employ not only personal but also social information in their 
decisions(Robinson et al., 2009a). 
 
Partial decoupling between individual and collective scales 
Cooperative transport is the process in which a group of ants retrieves a food item much too 
large for any of them to move on their own. During this process, the information available to 
individuals may be plainly misleading and counterproductive for the group's collective goals. 
This happens when trajectories to the nest as experienced by the small ants may be 
inaccessible to the large loads and even take it towards dead-ends that are difficult to 
escape. It was shown that to avoid such deadlocks, the macroscopic scale occasionally 
decouples from the possibly misleading information available at the microscopic scale(Fonio 
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et al., 2016). This mechanism allows the group to utilize beneficial information while using 
noise present at the group level to escape deadlocks (local minima) and avoid the potentially 
devastating consequences of fully relying on misleading information. Importantly, such 
decoupling does not require that any single individual detect at any point in time, whether 
information is valuable or misleading.  
 
Emergence in this system is evident as a separation between collective and individual 
behavior. This is evident, as the carrying group (and the food item they transport) does not 
follow a trajectory that was suggested by any single ant. 
 
Collective response independent of individual actions 
In some cases, the group can display effective reactions to stimuli that are not conceived by 
any individual. Such can be the case in which a cooperatively carrying group hits an obstacle. 
In such instances, instead of attempting to advance directly towards the nest, the group  
decouples from the actions of its individual members and goes into a perpendicular motion 
that takes the carried piece of food towards the edges of the obstacle(Gelblum et al., 2015). 
It was shown that this change in collective motion does not require that any individual ant 
be aware of the obstacle and individually change her behavior(Gelblum et al., 2016). Rather, 
the physical constraint induced by the obstacle directly affects the group as a whole. As a 
response, the group’s mode of motion changes in a way that facilitates obstacle 
circumvention. 
Self-organization withouta blueprint 
A final example for emergent behavior involves nest construction. Social insects construct 
some of the most magnificent structures in the biological world(Theraulaz et al., 2003). This 
is done through a stigmergic process(Theraulaz and Bonabeau, 1999) in which individuals 
locally interact with features of the structure by adding (or removing, in the case of dug 
nests) building material to them(Franks and Deneubourg, 1997). This induces indirect 
communication as insects interact with the product of the action of their nest-mates. It was 
further shown that, in some cases, building materials are combined with a volatile 
construction pheromone(Khuong et al., 2016). This adds a temporal dimension to the 
physical structure and expands the possibilities for local rules and the complexity of the 
resulting structure(Khuong et al., 2016).  
In contrast to trail formation, for example, where the result of the collective effort is a 
refinement of almost complete structures suggested by individual ants, nest construction 
creates structures which appear to be far from the capabilities of any individual. Indeed, in 
this high form of emergence, it is unlikely that individuals have a blueprint of the desired 
final product. Nevertheless, they follow local rules and such that their collective effort 
results in the construction of intricate nests. 
Discussion 
The first three sections of this discussion follow the structure of the previous example 
section. We raise and then discuss some hypotheses regarding the prevalence of collective-
scale behaviors which strongly rely on the cognitive capabilities of individuals. 
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Individual-based collective cognition 
An important factor to note is that many of the immediate requirements of the social group 
coincide with those of the individuals that comprise this group. Like the solitary insect, the 
colony must also scan the environment for food (Gordon, 1995), locate shelters (Franks et 
al., 2002), transport food (Gelblum et al., 2015), confront predators (Lamon and Topoff, 
1981; Monographs, 2016), and care for brood (Siveter et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015). As 
noted above, the cognitive abilities of individuals in a colony do not seem to greatly differ 
from those of their solitary counterparts. As such the cognition of individuals within a colony 
hold direct advantages to the group as a whole.TheIndividual based collective 
cognitionsection,above, providesexampleswherein the actions of a single individual suffice 
for directing the entire colony.  
Generally speaking, amplifying of the behavior of an individual requires two colony level 
processes: First,the identification of the specific individual of interest and then the 
amplification of its behavior. For example, as mentioned above, the first ant to find a food 
source has the capacity to trace the complete path between the nest and the 
food(Cammaerts and Cammaerts, 1980; Hölldobler, 1976; Wilson, 1962). This ant makes 
itself identifiable by laying pheromone markings on the surface as it heads back to the 
nest(Beckers et al., 1992a). Amplification occurs as ants that follow this trail enforce it with 
further pheromonal markings. Finally, mass foraging develops along the trail drawn out by 
the initial recruiting ant(Beckers et al., 1989). In many cases, solutions provided by different 
individuals are in conflict such that one solution is amplified this must come at the expense 
of others. In this case a third decision making process occurs alongside identification and 
amplification. Some mechanisms by which such collective decisions occur include the 
preferential reinforcement of preferred solutions, such as preferred food sources being 
marked by higher pheromone concentrations (Beckers et al., 1992b; Jaffe and Howse, 1979; 
Sumpter and Beekman, 2003)and cross inhibition between alternative emerging solutions, 
as occurs during honeybee recruitment (Nieh, 2010). 
 
Combining individual perspectives 
It is not always the case that an individual insect holds the complete solution to the colony's 
current needs. In fact, inherent constraints work to limit the value of individually held 
information. A first constraint involves the size of the individual when compared to that of 
its colony. Colonies reside over territories that are tens of meters (in the case of ants) or 
even kilometers (for wasps and bees) across and include large elaborate nest structures on a 
scale of several meters (Tschinkel, 2004). It is impossible for a single individual whose size is 
on the order of one centimeter to individually monitor these large areas. Other constraints 
are  a single individual propensity to be badly informed, mistakenly wrong, or be limited by 
its cognitive capacity (Sasaki and Pratt, 2012). 
The second set of examples as above highlights behaviors in which the group holds useful 
information about the environment but this information is distributed among a large 
number of individuals. Using communication, these information fragments can be integrated 
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to yield collective decisions that take the “big picture” into account.  Such integration can 
often be classified using two general schemes defined for animal groups in general: The 
“many eyes principle” (Ward et al., 2011) in which the group's capacity for surveillance 
increases with the number of alert animals and the "many wrongs principle"(Biro et al., 
2006; Simons, 2004) in which averaging effects work to reduce "noise" at the scale of an 
individual animal to yield accurate collective action. Integration of information happens over 
a large number of contexts and species.Some recurring principles in this process include: 
distributed integration, nonlinearities (Sumpter and Beekman, 2003), positive and negative 
feedback loops (Franks et al., 2002; Nieh, 2010), use of interaction rates and cuing delays 
(Camazine, 1993; Greene et al., 2013), higher influence and lower propensity to be 
influenced by better informed individuals (Korman et al., 2014; Razin et al., 2013; Schultz et 
al., 2008), and correctly weighing individual vs. social information (Robinson et al., 2009b; 
Robinson et al., 2012).  
This section also presents examples in which colonies have evolved to achieve a collective 
task by amplifying the behaviors of individuals that work towards the small scale version of 
this same task. For example, in the context of cooperative transport the actions of a leader 
ant are exactly those she would take when individually transporting a small food item to the 
nest. The group allows these actions to be the driving force behind the transport of a large 
heavy item. 
Emergent group level cognition 
Last, some colony functions may fall outside of the solitary insect's behavioral or cognitive 
repertoire. These include large scale behaviors such as assessing the relation between the 
size of two objects when bothof these are much larger than the insect itself (Fonio et al., 
2016; Gelblum et al., 2016), and active food dissemination (Camazine, 1993; Greenwald et 
al., 2015; Howard and Tschinek, 1981). In such cases, to achieve the group-level task, the 
relevant capabilitiesmust arise either by newly evolved individual traits or through a 
collective process that relies on the connectivity between individuals (a combination of 
these two options is also possible). Cases in which group level processes bestow the group 
with abilities that are qualitatively beyond those of its individual members can, by 
definition(De Wolf and Holvoet, 2005), be considered as a form of emergence. 
In the two examples of cooperative transport presented above, group problem solving 
capabilities increase beyond those of individuals. In these cases, the small size of individual 
insect may prevent it from grasping the relevant large-scale relationships between the 
carried load and the obstacle. Therefore, in these cases the problem solving on the level of 
the group must decouple to some extent from the array of, possibly misleading, solutions as 
offered by individuals, even if these are highly adept navigators. The mechanisms that 
enable such decoupling between the scales do not have to be complex. In these examples, 
group-level noise in scent mark following (Fonio et al., 2016) and the persistence that results 
from alignment of forces (Gelblum et al., 2016) suffice for efficient transport that interacts 
with the environment on the relevant scale of the ant team and the large carried load.   
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Stigmergic nest construction holds the potential for higher levels of emergence. Here, nest 
construction is carried out by individuals who follow simple local rules while constantly 
reacting to the environmental product of their previous actions (Grassé, 1959). Following 
these stigmergic principles (Theraulaz et al., 2003) may allow insects to construct elaborate 
nest architectures (Tschinkel, 2004) without any blueprint. The degree of emergence in such 
processes is difficult to define. On the one hand, by using a stigmergic process, a single 
insect, a solitary queen for example, may construct a structure for which it holds no internal 
representation (Camazine et al., 2001; Theraulaz and Bonabeau, 1999). A larger group in 
which each individual follows the same rules may achieve faster construction but the quality 
of emergence remains constant (Theraulaz and Bonabeau, 1999). On the other hand, it has 
been shown that pheromone deposition onto the constructed nest is an essential part of 
collective stigmergic nest construction. The addition of this time dependent component 
(pheromones evaporate) has the potential of allowing the group to achieve more complex 
forms of emergence not achievable by a single individual working alone (Khuong et al., 
2016). Indeed, such processes can be modeled using the mathematics of cellular automata a 
theory which holds the potential of describing extreme forms of emergence(Wolfram, 2002). 
Prevalence of individual-based mechanisms 
Next, we raise somehypothesesin anattempt to provide rationale for the observed 
imminence of individuals to colony scale processes. 
As shown above, it is often the case that colony level behaviors are a consequence of the 
direct of amplification of individual actionsthat rely on individual cognition.  This didn't have 
to be the case. One could imagine an evolutionary pathway where collective cognition is 
constructed from a network of different individuals each manifesting different, possibly 
more basic, capabilities.In this case, the actions of individuals don't directly coincide with the 
actions of the group or even with each other. Rather, group performance emerges from the 
coordination between individuals. An example for this are neurons in the brain. Neurons 
have evolved to be cells whose actions are purely computational such that their spiking 
activity bears no direct relations to the collective process at which they participate. 
Hypothetically, there is no a-priori prevention that such structures arise in a social insect 
colony to serve as the basis for highly efficient collective scale behaviors. Why, therefore, is 
this not the general case? 
We suggest that the first part of the answer to this question has to do with the availability 
and high quality performances that individual-based group level cognition can achieve. As 
stated above, by the time group cognition has evolved, individual insects were already 
developed independent organisms(Farris and Schulmeister, 2010; Ma et al., 2012). As such, 
they already possessed many of the cognitive resources that are required by the group. 
Furthermore, these individual capabilities are, in no sense, simple. For example, individual 
insects are highly adept navigators. To get from one place to another individual insects 
employ a toolbox consisting of multiple tactics, often applied in parallel. Across different 
insects, these include landmark navigation (Collett et al., 1993), dead reckoning (Collett and 
Collett, 2000), backtracking (Wystrach et al., 2013), and cognitive map (Gould, 
1986)navigation by means of scents (Morgan, 2009), visual cues (Collett et al., 1993; Esch et 
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al., 2001; Wehner, 2003), temperature, and even magnetic fields. Collective cognition that 
relies on such individual capabilities holds the advantage of utilizing these highly non-trivial 
traits. 
The fact that individual insects possess high cognitive capabilities does not, however, suffice 
in explaining why these capabilities take a central role in many collective level processes.In 
the context of the navigation example as in the previous paragraph,it may very well be the 
case that a navigational toolbox that relies on the distributed actions of a large number of 
cooperating insects not only exists but, also, outperforms other, individual-based, schemes. 
Again, one may ask why this is not the general case and why the role of individuals has 
remained so pronounced throughout evolution.  We hypothesize that the answer to this 
question has to do with the complexity of efficient distributed solutions given the inherent 
constraints that apply for a colony of autonomous individuals. We hypothesize that in many 
cases, simple distributed algorithms would not outperform what is readily achievable by 
amplifying individual cognition. We further hypothesize that distributed algorithms that do 
surpass simpler amplification processes may be expected to be highly complex and therefore 
difficult to evolve. Hence, the system may be trapped within local minima within the fitness 
landscape which utilize the individual cognitive components that have evolved at earlier 
stages. The next sectiondiscusses some of the non-trivial limitations on emergent behavioral 
solutions. 
Computational constraints on emergent collective cognition 
Emergence is often associated with the notion of a group that “exceeds the sum of its 
parts”. Theoretically speaking, achieving such highly effective cooperation typically requires 
a substantial degree of coordination. An intuitive example for this is the parallel search 
problem in which a group of non-communicating random walkers that start at a given 
location aim to collectively cover an area and then share the profits of their findings. In this 
context, to “exceed the sum of its parts” implies that the group of N searchers cover the 
area more than N times faster than each individual, were it acting on its own. In fact, in 
many natural topologies (Alon et al., 2011; Efremenko and Reingold, 2009), the situation is 
very far from this. For example, in grid topologies when searchers do not communicate and 
as long as N is not too small, multiple random walks that start from a single point, typically 
achieve negligible speed-up in cover time when compared to a single searcher(Alon et al., 
2011) (i.e., the group takes almost as much time to cover an area as a single one of its 
members). In this case, being part of a group becomes highly unbeneficial from an 
individual’s point of view: food must be shared but without the advantage of obtaining it at 
a faster rate.  
Biological systems often achieve emergence using involved communication. The most 
celebrated example for this is that of the brain, viewed as a large ensemble of neurons. In 
the case of brains, such coordination heavily relies on the fact that the neurons are 
organized into stable networks such that the set of neighboring neurons of a given neuron 
remains, relatively, fixed. Synaptic plasticity allows a pair of neighboring neurons to undergo 
a mutual feedback process and fine-tune theirconnectivity(Hebb, 1949). This, as 
conceptually demonstrated by the Hopfield model (Hopfield, 1982), may provide the system 
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with its immense computational power. Indeed, Hopfield networks have been shown to be 
capable of universal computation in the Turing sense (Síma and Orponen, 2003).  
What can one expect for social insect colonies? On the one hand,these are very far from 
being non-communicating. On the other hand, interaction networks appear to be more 
loosely defined than those that characterize a brain. Indeed, in the insect colony fixed 
organization structures may be difficult to achieve for long periods of time, due to the 
inherent mobility and anonymity constraints. This lack of structure leads to a lack of 
knowledge that further constrains the system(Burgos and Polani, 2016). Namely, while 
learning in the brain happens by strengthening the synaptic connections between pairs of 
specific hard-wired (and therefore mutually identifiable) neurons, it is difficult imagine such 
mechanisms for freely moving, anonymous insects. Further, many brain functions are known 
to depend on precise interaction patterns that enable, for example, high levels of 
synchrony(Abeles, 2010). Such preciseness is difficult to imagine in the case of autonomous 
independent agents. 
It appears that things become even worse if communication and information flows across 
the systems are, themselves, limited or distorted (Feinerman and Korman, 2012; Feinerman 
et al., 2014; Korman et al., 2014; Razin et al., 2013). The highly dynamic environment and 
interchanging network structures that characterize the social insect colony make it difficult 
to implement error correcting mechanisms such as repeatedly sending the same message in 
orderto reduce distortion.  As demonstrated in (Feinerman and Korman, 2012; Feinerman et 
al., 2014; Korman et al., 2014; Razin et al., 2013) such circumstances make even basic 
distributed tasks, such as rumor spreading, challenging. It is therefore reasonable to assume 
that emergent phenomena would be even more difficult to implement in such conditions.  
 
Summary 
Useful information exists at the level of the individual insect. This often suffices for the 
group's needs and indeed we have presented many examples in which the group follows 
individuals by amplifying their effect. In other cases, the inherent scale gap between 
individual and group may render information held by individuals partial, irrelevant, or even 
misleading to the collective goals of the group. In such cases, emergent collective 
phenomenon may kick in. Cognition that emerges at the level of the colony is subject to 
multiple constraints that mainly result from the fact that individuals maintain their 
autonomy as insects within the colony. Indeed, the most complex collective circuits 
described to date(Nieh, 2010; Pratt et al., 2005; Seeley et al., 2011)  may be defined as 
simple when compared to the neural circuits that allow, for example, an ant to find her nest 
by using vector integration(Ofstad et al., 2011; Wehner, 2003). 
Interestingly, the ways in which collective cognition appears, even during a single behavior, 
are not mutually exclusive.An example for thiscomes from cooperative transport in 
Paratrechina longicornis ants. Indeed, during this behavior the ants simultaneously benefit 
from both individual based(Gelblum et al., 2015) and collective based cognition(Fonio et al., 
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2016; Gelblum et al., 2016). This balance between the organizational scales allows the 
system to enjoy the best of both the macroscopic and the microscopic worlds. 
Forming better connections between different collective behaviors and the levels of 
emergence that characterize them requires further research. We suggest that such research 
be focused on two avenues. The first is a computational study of the powers and limitations 
of natural distributed algorithms(Feinerman et al., 2014; Greenwald et al., 2015). 
Specifically, there is a need to better understand the complexity and evolvabilty of 
distributed solutions of different qualities. The second avenue involves empirical studies that 
attempt to trace the evolution of emergent, communication-based solutions. An example for 
this direction can be a comparative study of nest structures across a large number of 
phylogenetically related ant or termite species. 
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